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Abstract:
The rise of interest in the social economy as a sector with a significant role to play in the changing dynamic of state/private sector relations has engendered a
wide range of policies and practices that seek to both clarify and amplify the strategic role of this “third sector”. In Ecuador, this issue has recently become
linked with the attempts of the state to promote the notions of a social knowledge economy and Buen Vivir as new references for a type of political economy
that is oriented around service to the common good. This paper examines the particular relation of the social economy to these two notions, and also what this
relationship implies for new forms of governance and the idea of the Partner State as a new form of state/civil symbiosis. Particular attention is paid to the
unique role of the social economy with respect to the provision of social goods. The paper explores key principles associated with the proper functioning of the
social economy in this new context, and proposes a public policy “ecosystem” geared towards maximising both the efficacy and autonomy of the social
economy as a driver of new forms of social and economic production, and as a template for the reform of government itself.
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Introduction
Over the last 20 years, there has arisen a global interest in the role that the
social economy plays in the economic and social life of nations. This
interest has spawned a growing literature on the nature and role of the
social economy, its size and composition, its operating rules and
organising principles, its relevance for the economic and social well-being
of societies, and its relation to the state on the one hand and the private
sector on the other.
Increasingly, the social economy is being viewed as the repository of those
social, cultural and political values that are most relevant for protecting
and advancing the collective good. These values include the idea of
reciprocity as the driving force of social economy organisations, the
pursuit of social aims through the practice of mutuality, and the promotion
of social solidarity through the advancement of social and economic
equity.
For these reasons, and as a result of the upheavals brought on by free
market capitalism, the social economy is also emerging as a complement
to the state for the social welfare of citizens—a role made increasingly
necessary by the abrogation of this duty on the part of governments. The
economic crisis and the domination of neoliberal ideology have thus
combined to thrust the social economy into a historic spotlight and to play
a central role in the reconfiguration of the body politic of nations the world
over.
However, the social economy is far more than the application of co-
operative or self-help strategies operating at the margins of the economy to
help the poor, as is sometimes believed. Nor is the social economy merely
a collection of economic self-defense measures against the failures and
depredations of the “free market” economy. Rather, the social economy
represents a wholly different conception of economics in which market
forces and economic practice serve social or collective interests, rather
than just those of capital or the individual.
The social economy is composed of civil organisations and networks that
are driven by the principles of reciprocity and mutuality in service to the
common good—usually through the social control of capital. It is composed
of co-operatives, non-profit organisations, foundations, voluntary groups,
and a whole range of associations that operate both inside the market, as
many successful co-operatives and Fair Trade groups do, or in non-market
provision of goods or services. These include cultural production, the
provision of health or social care, and the provision of food, shelter or
other necessities to people in need. In its essence, the social economy is a
space and a practice where economics is at the service of social ends, not
the other way round.
Finally, social economy organisations represent a wide spectrum of
political values and aims, some of which are in direct opposition (e.g.,
hunting clubs vs. wildlife groups). The social economy, although certainly
based on collective social values and aims, does not belong exclusively
either to the Left or to the Right, and it is wrong to perceive it as
representing a uniform political ideology.
The case of Ecuador
All these questions have come into the foreground in Ecuador, where the
government has adopted the concept of Buen Vivir, or “Good Living”, as
the centerpiece of its National Plan and its (proclaimed) political outlook
(National Secretariat of Planning and Development, 2013).[1] It is with
reference to this plan that this paper was originally penned, with the
intention of showing how the social economy, and its relation to the state
and to the question of governance, plays a central role in realising an
alternative to the market logic of neo-liberalism through the establishment
of a social knowledge economy as the framework for a new kind of
political economy (Restakis, 2014). This, in essence, was the aim of the
FLOK Society project (Free/Libre Open Knowledge) launched in 2013, to
which this writer contributed as a researcher.
As envisaged in Ecuador’s National Plan, Buen Vivir relates to a model of
political economy that opposes neo-liberalism and attempts a unique
balance between free and open access to knowledge; an informed and
mobilised citizenry; a form of decentralised, democratic, and locally
accountable governance; an economic and public policy in service to the
collective good; and, above all, respect and stewardship of the rights of
nature as guaranteed by the Constitution.
This paper relates the ideas and policy proposals developed for Ecuador to
a larger framework for the promotion of social economy principles and the
concept of the Partner State as components of a radical re-visioning of
political economy in general. In our view, these are two fundamental
elements for understanding how economics can be reconnected to social
values and to the pursuit of the common good as the foundation of a new,
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ethical model of political economy. The work undertaken in Ecuador for
the articulation and realisation of a social knowledge economy and the
aims of the National Plan have a universal relevance and, as such, the case
of Ecuador serves as a valuable springboard and reference for the
exploration of a radical alternative to neo-liberalism as the governing
paradigm for economic and social development.
While Ecuador was the initial reference for this work, in this broader
context, we examine how bold public policy can place the social economy
in a central role for transforming the productive matrix of a country.
Whether we are speaking of the provision of human and social services, or
of the material production of goods and services in the commercial
economy, we argue that, within the prevailing neo-liberal paradigm, the
logic and organisation of the social economy is fundamental to any
meaningful transformation of a nation’s economic structure. As such, the
social economy and the Partner State appear as central elements in any
transition to a Commons and Co-operative-Based Economy.
In contrast to neoliberalism, in which capital (with the help of compliant
governments) undermines and displaces the state through the colonisation
and privatisation of the public domain, we examine how governments can
strengthen the social economy through the creation of policies that
reinforce the civic principles and purposes that are the basis of public
goods and services.
In Ecuador, where the state is playing an increasing role in the nations’
body politic, this requires a wholly new relationship between the state and
civil society. It is a relationship that embodies fundamental principles of
shared power, of collaboration and co-construction of public policy, and
the creation of new institutions capable of transitioning to a model of
Partner State in which the state is the enabler and promoter of civic values
and the common good as the primary aims of government. But these are
also principles that apply equally to countries—many of them in the
industrialised North—in which the state is being diminished and where
public services are being privatised and colonised by capital.
A central purpose of this strategy is to also address the dependence of civil
society institutions on government. This is especially true with respect to
the production of human and social services. In this arena, and despite its
formal distinctions from the state, the social economy remains a dependent
sector—in many ways, a client sector of the state. At a time when
governments in many countries have all but erased the distinctions
between the private and public sectors, this continuing dependence is a
fatal weakness that allows capital interests to continue their domination of
public policy and to perpetuate an economic system that is subservient to
these interests. This is one reason why special attention is paid to the vital
area of social goods and services. (By social goods, I am referring to goods
whose use is the realisation of collective or mutual benefit or value, as
opposed to the generation of private or commercial benefit.)
This is not to say that social economy enterprises operating in the
commercial economy are to be ignored. Social economy enterprises, such
as co-operatives, are absolutely vital to the economic interests of small
producers in the agricultural economy, to artisans and crafters, to
community-based financial services, such as credit unions and community
banks, and increasingly to the emergence of immaterial goods and services
provided by digital technology through the operation of peer-to-peer
networks that are also based on co-operative and commons values and
practices.
One of our key arguments is that if the social economy is to mature as an
independent social and political force, then a true social market
corresponding to the unique role of the social economy as a force for
democratising the economy is fundamental. Only in this way might the
overwhelming power and influence of the capitalist market be brought into
balance with civic values. A strong and autonomous social economy based
on reciprocity, mutuality and civic values also make possible the political
power necessary to negotiate a new social contract for a post neo-liberal
age.
Toward a new paradigm: Beyond the welfare
state
In the global South, the questions concerning the traditional operations of
the welfare state are quite different from those of the industrialised North.
For a very long period of time, countries like Ecuador suffered from a
weak state infrastructure that was unable to provide the kinds of social
services that citizens had come to expect in industrialised states. The idea
of the welfare state was still a work in progress—something to be aimed for
in the future, as opposed to being dismantled in the present.
In these cases, where national economies have been growing—along with
state institutions—the situation is often one of growing state intervention
and involvement in the public economy. In education, in health services, in
the provision of social security, governments have developed universal
public services that were never available before. In these cases, the
challenges lie rather with the statist forms of these services and the
weaknesses inherent in a purely statist conception of social care.
What we are arguing is that rather than repeating the mistakes of mass
production state welfare systems of the mid-20th century, that a new form
of social economy welfarism can be developed that takes further the social
innovations developed by such jurisdictions as Italy and Quebec. There is
an opportunity here to create new models of social welfare that learn from,
and move beyond, the weaknesses of the old statist structures. Health,
education, and other forms of social welfare are all open to more
responsive, more flexible and ultimately more effective forms of care
when coupled with the untapped power and potential of the social
economy.
The application of social economy principles and practices, such as
reciprocity and co-operation, and the emergence of democratic, distributed
and user-controlled social care systems, may allow nation states to move to
a new configuration of social welfare—that of the Partner State—which
reinforces the rise of civil networks, supports new forms of social
innovation and recognises the central role of civil society in promoting the
common good, especially in the area of social care.
Both in the industrialised North and the “developing” South, the
stewardship role of the state is under siege. The colonisation of public and
social space by capital in the North is one of the effects of shrinking
opportunities for profit making in the private sector. In the South, and now
in the debt-ridden regions of southern Europe, it is also the method by
which global capital and its institutions (e.g., the IMF) impose austerity on
national economies by dismantling the public economies of these
countries. At the very moment when weak economies and rising
unemployment demand a strong social safety net, public services are being
turned into sources of private profit. With governments as willing partners,
the privatisation of public goods and the monetisation of social care now
beckon as a new frontier from which profits might be wrung—from the
provision of health care and clean water, to the running of education
systems and prisons.
It is quite clear how the institutions of private capital might invest in—and
profit from—what were once public services. What is far from clear is
whether the institutions of the social economy are equipped to respond to
this new reality. The market failures in human services in both the private
and the public economies are now arguably the central public policy issue
of modern societies. It is for this reason that we focus much of our
discussion below on this question.
How might governments respond to this dilemma? Can they foster civic
solutions that provide an alternative to the privatisation of social goods on
the one hand, and the stifling effects of top-down statism on the other?
How might these solutions be fashioned to reflect, and reinforce, those
social-serving values, operations and principles that are the greatest
strength of the social economy itself?
Finally, how might the social economy enlarge its presence and influence
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in the broader commercial economy? How do social economy enterprises
acquire the resources and skills they need to flourish within an overtly
hostile environment dominated by private capital? How do they build on
their successes and scale up and out? And finally, how do they capitalise
on the new logic of networks, distributed production and digital
technology that are so consonant with their inherent social values and
strengths?
The creation of what we may call a social market for these purposes, and
the development of free and open knowledge systems that serve them, is
essential to this task.
The social economy and the social market
The rise of interest in the social economy has also given rise to an interest
in measuring its economic value and its relative size within the broader
economy. In Ecuador, according to the Institute for Social Security, the
social/solidarity economy comprises 25.7% of the nation’s GDP and
48.9% of employment is generated in enterprises of fewer than 11
employees. A study by the DGRV (Cruz, 2003) also shows that, in
1999-2002, the current portfolio of credit unions experienced a growth of
384.73% compared to 49.94% for banks. These figures are impressive and
help to gauge key aspects of the social economy. But while appropriate for
the measure of commercial exchange, the determination of value solely on
the basis of commercial principles—of monetary value—is antithetical to the
character and needs of the social economy. A different valuation is
required.
The purpose of the social economy is not primarily about the production
and exchange of goods and services in pursuit of private ends, or of
monetary value, but rather the creation and use of social relations for the
production of social value. This is true whether social economy
organisations are producing social goods and human services or whether
they are engaged in commercial production within the mainstream
economy. It is the social aims and collective nature of these enterprises
that distinguish them from capitalist firms. Social values are embedded in
the structure of these organisations and a market for the creation of social
value is not the same as a market for capitalist accumulation. What then is
a market for social value?
In most countries, the character of social economy organisations and their
role in society is implicitly acknowledged as different from that of private
businesses and requiring a different approach. For example, governments
provide tax support to social economy organisations, such as co-
operatives, non-profits and charities, because they create social benefits
that are worth supporting and are in the public interest.
Around the world, the principle of tax exemption to non-profits is well
established. Traditionally, the work of these societies was conceived as
relieving a burden that would otherwise be borne by the state for such
things as providing relief to the poor, running hospitals, caring for the
vulnerable and indigent, etc. In return for these services, the state
compensated societies through an exemption on tax. But it was also a
condition of the exemption that no profits could be retained by the society,
nor distributed to its governors or members. This is the constraint on the
distribution of profits that today defines non-profits under legislation that
governs their operation, as is the case in Ecuador.
But in an age where the sophistication and complexity of social economy
organisations extends far beyond simple charity models, and where hybrid
models such as social enterprises and community benefit companies
employ market mechanisms to pursue social goals, the old tax exemptions
based on constraints to the distribution of profit are wholly inadequate.
They fail to capture both the reality and the potential of the social
economy as an economic sphere deserving equal treatment, on its own
terms, to that granted the private and public sectors. They also perpetuate
the false notion that the generation of profit is incompatible with the
pursuit of social benefit.
The reason for this is that profit is still conceived strictly in capitalist
terms, which is to say as a private good. But what of profit that is a social
good, a collective asset, as in the case of co-operatives, where it is
designated as a “surplus”? The real question is not the issue of profit, but
rather the purposes for which this profit or surplus is created and utilised.
Recognition of profit as a social asset has paradigm-changing
implications—not only for the social economy, but also for how the public
interest is defined, developed and defended.[2]
One of the key tasks before us in this age of unfettered privatisation is how
to reverse the colonisation of the public domain by capital and, instead, to
foster and expand the social control of capital for the common good. This
is the essential attribute of the social economy—its social character and the
embeddedness of market exchanges within a network of social relations
that are driven not by the private interests of the capitalist market, but by
the collective and mutualist aims of friends, neighbours, communities and
society as a whole.
A new approach
What are needed are social and economic policies that recognise the social
and mutual foundations of the social economy as a distinct paradigm that
relates social principles to the economy, to resource allocation, and to a
new understanding of wealth creation. A nation’s social economy
contributes to the socialisation and democratisation of markets and the
economy and is a key force for transforming the productive matrix. In
short, the social economy is a unique space with its own requirements and
in need of institutions that reflect the logic and aims of its operations. This
entails a holistic and integrated approach to social economy development
and the creation of what might be called an “ecosystem” of institutional
supports analogous to the existing ecosystem of capitalist institutions that
service the capitalist economy.
With respect to the production of social or relational goods and services,
there is also an urgent need to understand and to construct a type of social
market that supports and values the production and exchange of social
relations without turning them into commodities as is the case in capitalist
markets.
On what basis could such a policy, and such a market, operate? The
answer lies in the socio/economic principles that lie at the heart of social
economy organisations and of the social economy as a whole—reciprocity,
mutuality and social benefit.
Unlike the drive for private profit that animates the behaviour of firms in
the private sector, social economy organisations are animated by the
principles of reciprocity and mutuality for the pursuit of collective
economic and social aims, largely through the social control of capital.
Reciprocity and mutuality in pursuit of social aims define both the
activities and the aims of social economy organisations—whether they are
co-operatives, volunteer organisations or social enterprises. Their primary
purpose is the promotion of collective benefit. Their product is not just the
particular goods or services that they produce, but also human solidarity
and social capital. And, as opposed to the capitalist principle of capital
control over labour, these principles are the means by which a social
interest—whether it takes the form of labour, citizen groups or
consumers—can exercise control over capital.
With respect to public services and social goods, the key question,
therefore, is this: How can reciprocity and mutuality be actualised as
institutional forces to provide for the human services that are not being met
by government or the private sector?
Taxation, capital formation and social benefit
One of the key ideas we propose is the central role that social markets play
in preserving and expanding the social economy’s role with respect to
social goods.
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The creation of social markets entails two things: (1) allowing social
economy organisations to raise capital directly through the issuance of
social capital shares or through the use of social currencies, and (2) the
development of a social market exchange that functions as a parallel
institution to the stock market for capital, except for use by the social
economy. Both these concepts are explored more fully below. But the first
point to be made is that of all the challenges that impede the growth and
potential of the social economy, the difficulty in accessing and controlling
capital is surely the most crippling. Solving this problem is, therefore,
essential for all types of social economy organisations, whether they
operate in the field of human and social services or in the commercial
economy.
There are many ways that public policy can expand the capacity of social
economy organisations. Rethinking and reforming tax policy is among the
most important and the most potent.
Social goods
One line of approach is to provide tax benefits and exemptions to
investments in social economy organisations. But there is a strong case for
extending these benefits to contributions made by supporters—whether
association members or other community members—to any organisation
whose primary purpose is the provision of a social good.
It is essential that non-profits and a wide range of social enterprises be able
to generate capital for their services through tax-exempt contributions
sourced from within civil society itself. Not only would the dependence of
social economy organisations on the state be mitigated, but the perpetual
rationing of capital due to the social economy’s dependence on state
funding could also be lessened. But for this to happen, the idea of non-
profits as organisations whose goals are incompatible with the generation
and utilisation of capital (profit) has to be left behind. It is a relic of a false
understanding of profit as a private good, and associated with an equally
outmoded understanding of markets as exclusively capitalist.
All enterprises, whether commercial or social, must generate a profit (or
surplus in the case of co-operatives) if they are to survive. The question is:
To what purpose is this profit or surplus put? Is it private or is it social?
The case of co-operatives clearly shows how profit can be a social good, as
well as a private one.
Co-operatives are a form of social economy organisation whose surplus is
collectively owned and utilised by its members for their mutual benefit.
When non-profits generate a surplus that is then reinvested in services to
community this, too, is profit transmuted into a common good. And just as
private capital is bent on privatising social wealth, so should the social
economy be focusing on ways to socialise capital.
A social economy understanding of the market, and of profit, makes it
possible to rethink society legislation so as to allow non-profits to issue
shares to raise capital, to accumulate capital in the form of undistributed
reserves for the pursuit of social ends, and to invest in other social
economy organisations and institutions that have the same purpose. The
development of the kinds of social purpose capital that are now possible in
the case of co-operatives should be extended to the whole of the social
economy, with the proviso that their use be transparent and democratically
accountable to contributors and service users.
This is essential. Without such accountability, there is the risk that capital
accumulated by an organisation for social purposes may ultimately be used
to pursue private interests—as is sometimes the case with non-profits that
have no structure for accountability to stakeholders. What is central in
protecting the pursuit of social ends is not the conventional prohibition on
the accumulation and distribution of profit, but rather the social constraint
imposed by democratic accountability for the use of that profit. It is
exactly the same principle that serves to protect the public interest when
applied to the taxing and spending practices of the state.
Let us now examine a case study from Japan that illustrates well the main
points that we are making with respect to how such a system might work
with respect to the provision of social goods and, in particular, the use of
social currencies for this purpose.
Case study: Fureai Kippu (Japan)
Japan currently has the most numerous and diverse forms of social, or
complementary currencies in use in the world (Kennedy and Lietaer,
2004). There were approximately 258 complementary currencies in use
across Japan in 2008.
Fureai Kippu is a reciprocity-based time banking system that was
developed over 40 years ago to provide care for the elderly. Fureai Kippu
literally means “Ticket for a Caring Relationship” and refers to the ticket
or credit that is earned when one volunteers their time helping seniors.
According to the first published research in Japanese in 1992, Fureai
Kippu is:
A generic term for various time-based systems, such as Time
Deposit, Point Deposit, Labour Bank, etc. … where members can
earn time credits or points for the hours they volunteer, providing
physical care, home help and emotional assistance to the care-
dependent members. These credits can then be registered by the
host organisation and saved in their personal accounts. Time credit
holders can withdraw and use their credits to buy care for
themselves or relatives as required (Sawayaka Welfare Foundation
(SWF), 1993).
Fureai Kippu adheres to a strict time banking model that tracks and then
reimburses volunteer time on the basis of earned credits. However, there
are variations in how banked time is reimbursed. The traditional model is
one that is strictly reciprocal and where earned credits are redeemed in
received services, either for oneself or for one’s relatives. A second model
also includes the redemption of volunteer time through a combination of
earned time credits and cash. In both models, dependent users of services
may pay a small user fee if they are unable to earn time credits because of
ill health or incapacity. These user fees are paid to the host organisation,
which in turn can offer a cash payment in combination with time credits to
volunteers.
Like time banking studies elsewhere, (Seyfang, 2004; Collom, 2007;
Ozanne, 2010), Fureai Kippu generates a number of positive impacts, in
addition to the obvious social benefit of offering an effective means of
providing care to the elderly. These include building personal relationships
and expanding social connections, improving the mental and physical
health of participants, promoting mutuality and responsibility with respect
to the care of vulnerable people; and helping to create a more equal
relationship between caregivers and recipients (Mayumi Hayashi, 2012).
Moreover, the system offers a civil model of care that is more cost-
effective, flexible and humane than expensive “top-down” models
typically associated with state care provision.
The Fureai Kippu model is not without its problems, however. One of
these has to do with designing reciprocal exchange systems that effectively
match earned credits to services received. In the case of NALC, during
2010 a total of 12,367 volunteer members assisted 3,126 dependent
members, earning 198,091 credits in total while only redeeming 10,548
(5%). The balance was redeemed by user fees or by the organisation (these
were paid in return for non-person based activities or work for the
organisation, such as office work or training). Over time, a total of nearly
1.7 million credits have been accumulated in individual members’
accounts. User fees are thus a key means of guaranteeing a means for
volunteer members to earn their time credits, while allowing dependent
members to purchase services they cannot otherwise earn.
Meanwhile, the system has adapted to the challenge of matching time
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credits to services by expanding the ways in which reciprocal exchanges
can be made. Unlike the traditional model where credits are exchanged for
elder services within the host system, either later in life for oneself or
currently for one’s relatives, a new “horizontal” system of exchange has
been developed in which time credits may be redeemed in a short time
frame in exchange for such services as child care and a range of other local
services (museums, recreational facilities, cash vouchers with local
businesses, etc.). This allows local municipalities and local businesses to
support the system, while promoting both community building and the
local economy. Time credits may also be used to pay for the monthly
insurance premiums of the state elder care system. Finally, unredeemed
credits may be donated to a shared pool for use by those who have no
means to access services otherwise.
While the Fureai Kippu system is not a panacea, the model is a successful
complement to formal state care systems. It is a key reason why
governments at both local and federal levels have supported the system,
including state efforts to recruit volunteers for the programmes. Starting in
2009, Yokohama City near Tokyo attracted over 4,000 volunteers in a
single year, largely due to the scheme that allows members to exchange
time credits for services other than elder care.
Moreover, with the proven value of Fureai Kippu to the communities it
serves and to state efforts to provide care to its aging population, the model
has been receiving serious attention for application in countries like the
UK where civil alternatives to state systems have become a priority for
government.
Lessons learned
A key lesson provided by Fureai Kippu in Japan, is that reciprocity and
mutualism can be valuated in strictly social, as opposed to monetary,
terms. Time banking is one approach that continues to offer non-
commercial solutions to the provision of social services, especially if these
are complemented by the role of the state. Fureai Kippu shows how a
reciprocity-based system rooted in local communities can work with state
systems to form the basis of public-civil partnerships that offer an
alternative to the privatisation and commodification of what should remain
social relationships of caring.
There is no reason why vouchers or other mechanisms for placing market
power in the hands of citizens should be associated exclusively with the
political Right—as they are. The use of market power for social care is just
as amenable for socially progressive purposes if the market in question is
structured around civic principles. Markets are not necessarily commercial,
or capitalist, and the sooner this is understood the sooner society can
address the contradiction between social goods on the one hand and
chronically under-funded and antisocial delivery systems on the other.
Governments and civil society must both grapple with how economics can
be made to work for civic purposes, and the creation of social markets is
essential to this. Innovative tax policy is also central to this aim.
What we are talking about is the creation of an institutional social market
through the formal valuation of social goods and the capitalisation of these
goods directly by citizens and the promotion of informal social markets
through communitarian mechanisms like social currencies that both
valuate and expand reciprocity and social capital in the provision of social
goods. The state retains a central role, however, as co-funder and
facilitator of these systems.
To be clear: This is not to advocate for the commodification of social
relations, nor is it the promotion of atomised and utilitarian relations in
place of social ones as is now the case with privatisation. Rather, we are
proposing forms of social currency that act as mediums of circulation for
the expansion of a new kind of social relationship between producer and
user based on the reciprocal and mutual character of social relations that
are characteristic of the social economy itself.
The social market exchange
What would such a social market exchange look like? There are currently
a number of social stock exchanges and they all share a common feature:
The ability to invest in a social enterprise through the purchase of shares
that yield a limited return to investors. This is one approach, and so long as
returns are not speculative and contained by clear social priorities they can
be a key source of needed capital. Otherwise, returns to investors for
support of social enterprise moves away from reciprocity and toward a
capitalist conception of social investment (Mendell and Gruet, 2012). By
contrast, what we are proposing is something that values both contribution
and return in terms of reciprocity. This is the reason we use the term
“contributor”, as opposed to “investor”.
What does this entail? First, it would mean the extension of tax
exemptions and benefits to contributions that support the creation and
distribution of social goods. In this way, the provision of a tax benefit to
social contributors acknowledges the key notion of a public benefit
compensated by the tax system on the reciprocity principle. It also
embodies the fundamental principle of public responsibility for social care
as a civic right. This is what taxes should do. But in addition, there needs
to be a re-alignment of powers with respect to control over the design and
delivery of social care itself. A number of factors seem essential.
The first requires shifting the production of some social care services from
government to democratically-structured civil institutions. Government
would retain its role as a prime funder for these services and for the
regulation and oversight that is necessary to protect the social character
and public interest entailed in these services. The first part of this equation
is already well underway. Governments have been unloading social
services to private and non-profit providers for over two decades. It is the
second aspect, the need for user control and service accountability that is
lacking (as too, is the funding). Social services that receive public funding
and are not under the direct control of the state should be conveyed only to
those organisations that provide control rights over the design and delivery
of those services to users.
This applies equally to non-profit and for-profit services. Examples
include organisations that provide elder care, family services, services to
people with disabilities, or childcare. Moreover, those services that remain
under state control (social security, public pensions, public auto insurance,
public schools, healthcare services, etc.) should be democratised through
the provision of control rights to users.
Second, government funding should, at least in part, flow directly to social
care recipients who would then select the services they need from
accredited organisations of their choice. To qualify for receipt of public
funds, these organisations must have provisions for user control in their
operations. In addition, funds must be made available for the organisation
of independent consumer-run organisations to assist users and their
families in the identification, evaluation and contracting of services to their
members. This is crucial, especially in the case of users that do not have
the means, or the capacity, to adequately select and contract services on
their own.
Third, social care organisations must have the legal ability to raise capital
from among users and from civil society in general, on the basis of social
investing. Both users and community members would be able to purchase
capital shares for the purpose of capitalising the association. As a social
investment, these shares would yield a prescribed value in services to
investors but, unlike conventional social investment models, investor
control within the association would be limited to ensure democratic
control by members. As social investments, these capital assets would not
be taxed.
Fourth, surpluses generated by these organisations should be considered, at
least in part, as social assets. All social care organisations receiving public
funds—whether in the form of vouchers or direct payments from
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government—would establish an indivisible reserve for the expansion and
development of that organisation and its services.[3] A portion of
operational surplus would also have to be used for the partial capitalisation
of a social market exchange through the purchase of shares in the
exchange.
Social capitalisation requires the creation of a social market based on
reciprocity and mutuality. For example, individual contributors could
purchase shares yielding a monetary value that is redeemed through the
use of a social good or service provided by any one of the accredited
organisations in the system, as in the example of Furrei Kippu.
A mechanism for mediating the issuance of social vouchers on the one
hand and their redemption on the other needs to be established to balance
what some organisations receive in contributions and others redeem in
services. The creation of a collective capital pool to help organisations pay
for redeemed shares might be one way of managing this. The collective
pool would be capitalised by the contributions of participating
organisations, and may include contributions of supporting individuals. A
social capital exchange of this type generates an independent source of
credit and investment capital to social economy organisations, in addition
to what they would receive from the state. Shares would be eligible for tax
credits on the basis that such contributions have a clear and direct social
benefit, as would a capital pool.
In these models, the primary role of government would be to continue to
provide public funds for social care services and to establish the rules of
the system. In partnership with service deliverers, caregivers and users, the
state would regulate and monitor service delivery, establish service
standards, license service providers, and enforce legal and regulatory
provisions.
Finally, the locus of service design and the designation of service needs
would take place, as much as possible, at the community and regional level
of delivery. This requires the creation of civil and municipal associations
of public and community stakeholders to ensure the accountability of
services and the flow of information necessary for effective budgeting,
service design and delivery.
The development of open knowledge systems whereby data and
information is transparent, open and freely accessible by citizens and
social economy organisations is a concrete way in which a social
knowledge economy can be linked to the operations and social aims of
social economy organisations.
Most importantly, this decentralisation of service delivery must include the
democratisation of decision-making through the sharing of control rights
with service users and caregivers. This is precisely the system that is in
place in cites like Bologna where social co-ops and their federations deal
directly with municipalities to determine the service needs of communities
and to manage their delivery.
A word of caution, however, must be noted. Such policies have proven
highly effective in the cases of places like Quebec, Italy and Japan because
there existed fairly high levels of social capital that were in turn reinforced
by a culture that valued reciprocity. This is especially true of Japan, and
hence the Fureai Kippu system both reflected and reinforced this culture
even though there did not exist a large number of non-profits, as was the
case, for example, in Quebec (Mayumi Hayashi, 2012). In Italy, a long
tradition of co-operative organisations helped form the institutional
foundation for the evolution and spread of social co-ops.
What this means in practical terms is that democratising and de-
centralising policies from government are not enough. What must also be
considered is the educational and community development work that is
needed to provide for the ongoing evolution of the civil institutions and
cultural attitudes that form the basis for this kind of civil and cultural
transformation.
Crucial to this is the development of multi-stakeholder intermediaries that
can act as interlocutors with government on behalf of the broader social
economy. At a service level, multi-stakeholder organisations representing
different stakeholders and interests can negotiate contracts and services, co-
ordinate organisation and production, and support the social economy
providers with cross sectoral training, logistics support, collective
purchasing, financing, etc.
Popular education programmes to raise awareness and understanding of
this new approach among communities are also key. And, as outlined in
more detail below, there is an urgent need for higher-level academic
research, education and professional training for both civil servants and
social economy actors.
A policy ecosystem
A review of public policy trends and instruments for supporting the social
economy reveals a highly developed array of strategies developed by many
countries.
Most importantly, it is crucial that a government’s social, educational,
developmental and financial policies combine to create an integrated, yet
diversified, ecosystem of institutional supports that together create an
environment within which the social economy might flourish throughout
the economy. These integrated programmes may be broadly organised
along four mutually supportive axes:
1. Tax policy and public subsidy
2. Financial support and social investment
3. Community education, mobilisation and development
4. Research, higher education and professional training
In general, the role of government in administering these initiatives may be
summarised as follows:
1. Facilitating the co-construction and co-implementation of national
Social Economy policy through direct collaboration with social
economy and other primary stakeholders (e.g., municipalities,
territorial governments)
2. Financial injection, investment and guarantees (seed money, loan
guarantees, interest-free loans for a certain period and possibly
renewed, etc.)
3. Fiscal policy—tax measures/incentives
4. Enabling legislation and regulation
Many of these initiatives have proven successful in strengthening the
capacity of social economy organisations to contribute to social well-being
through the production of much-needed social services and the increase in
training and employment that these services provide. In particular, the use
of co-operative models for the provision of social care has yielded not only
an increase in the range and quality of services available to the public, but
in jurisdictions like Italy and Quebec where public policy has supported
their development, social co-ops have generated a high proportion of the
new employment generated by the social economy.
In Quebec, the government funds 85% of the costs of daycare programmes
delivered by solidarity co-ops and other social economy organisations,
making the sector the 4th largest employer in the province. Solidarity co-
ops in Quebec account for fully 40% of the homecare services in that
province. In Italy, although social co-ops compose only 2% of non-profits,
they are responsible for 23% of jobs in that sector (Menzani and. Zamagni,
2009). In Bologna, 87% of the social services in that city are provided by
social co-ops under contract to the municipality (Restakis, 2010).
Within the broader commercial economy, social economy organisations
like co-operatives have prospered when access to basic capital
resources—owned and controlled by the social economy itself—has been
bolstered by progressive tax policy, by enabling legislation, by education
and professional development, and most of all, by the support of
representative civil associations that can identify and address the collective
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needs of the sector. Multi-stakeholder structures representing a broad
range of social economy actors have been key in this regard.
In summary, there is no question that a concerted use of public policies by
government can have a decisive effect on the capacity of the social
economy to play a much enhanced role in the provision of new goods and
services, in generating new opportunities for training and employment, and
in strengthening the productive capacities of key sectors through the use of
co-operative and other collective systems. But more than this, the growth
of a country’s social economy also lends to the diffusion of progressive
ideas and practices that, in turn, reinforce a progressive political economy
within the apparatus of the state and in the broader society. This is
essential for the pursuit and institutionalisation of those values that will, in
the long term, be the foundation for a more socially just and equitable
social order.
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Notes
[1] I say, “proclaimed” because of the many contradictions, both in policy
and practice that the Correa government has exhibited in recent years. This
is not to belittle the worthy aims of either the National Plan or the concept
of Buen Vivir as presented in official rhetoric or, indeed, in the country’s
institutions. It is important, however, to note the discrepancy between
rhetoric and reality.
[2] For purposes of this discussion on the nature of profit, I am focusing
primarily on profit as a product of the production process, not on the
production process itself. A case can be made that if the productive
process is itself exploitative can the profit, even if applied to collective or
mutualist aims, be termed a social good? I would argue that the two,
though intimately related, are distinct. And while profit generated through
exploitation is thereby tainted, its social use still designates it as a social
good. The broader question, as pointed out later in the discussion, is that
the social aims of the profit generated are also characteristic of the way in
which social economy organisations produce their goods and services.
This too, distinguishes social economy organisations from capitalist forms
of enterprise.
[3] Indivisible reserves have a long history in co-operatives and remain a
key means by which co-ops capitalise their operations. The reserve is
accumulated over time from the co-op’s surpluses and may not be
distributed to members—it is a collective asset for use as a social benefit
and is therefore not taxed. Indivisible reserves also have a far wider
significance, for they transform capital from a private to a collective or a
social asset. This operates both within an enterprise as a source of
emergency working capital, and more broadly as an intergenerational
asset that may be used for the benefit of the community as a whole.
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